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Abstract
We develop a theory of the emergence of merchant guilds as an e¢ cient mechanism to
foster cooperation between merchants and rulers, building on the complementarity between
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rulers. Our model delivers novel predictions about the emergence, variation, functioning, and
eventual decline of this highly successful historical form of network. Our theory reconciles
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work by Greif et al. (1994), merchant guilds have attracted considerable
attention by economists, and for good reason. This celebrated historical institution dominated
trade for several centuries, and its development was inextricably linked with the growth of
medieval towns and the rise of the merchant class. The merchant guild has also been viewed
by many as a shining example of social capital  see, e.g., Putnam et al., (1993)  bringing
major economic and social benets, thereby suggesting a very valuable potential role for such
social capital even in modern economies  see, e.g., Bardhan (1996), Dasgupta (2000), Raiser
(2001) and Stiglitz (1999).
Is this positive view of merchant guilds justied? What role did the guildssocial capital
play? What is the rationale for the way merchant guilds operated, and for their relationship
with medieval rulers? We address these questions theoretically, and then confront our models
predictions with the available historical evidence. The objective is to shed new light on the rea-
sons for the emergence, organization, functioning, and eventual decline of this highly successful
historical form of network.
Our model presents a very di¤erent, although complementary, theory of the emergence and
role of merchant guilds relative to the existing literature and in particular to Greif et al. (1994),
who were the rst to provide a formal model of merchant guilds. They developed a theory
of alien merchant guilds  i.e., associations of alien merchants supported by the rulers of the
polities in which they traded. Historically, though, most merchant guilds emerged as local
merchant guilds  i.e., associations of local merchants that obtained recognition and privileges
(including monopoly power over local trade) from their local rulers. Alien merchant guilds were
typically formed by the members of local merchant guilds who were active in long-distance
trade, and remained under the control and supervision of the guilds from the merchantspolities
of origin.1 Moreover, only a subset of local merchant guilds went on to form such foreign
branches, primarily in the main international trade centers. It is, therefore, of considerable
interest to understand the economic rationale for the emergence of local merchant guilds, and
the reasons why medieval rulers were willing to grant them recognition and privileges.2 This is
all the more important as local merchants dominated medieval towns, many of which acquired
considerable power and autonomy. Hence, studying the roots of merchantsorganizations and
their relationships with rulers is crucial in understanding the wider political economy forces that
shaped the development of towns and states.
Medieval rulers did not possess a reliable civil service to collect taxes, and employed a variety
1See, for example, Dessí and Ogilvie (2004, pp.9-11); Ogilvie (2011, pp. 24-25, 202-205). This should not be
taken to mean that only members of the local merchant guild of the polity of origin could be members of an alien
merchant guild: associate membership was sometimes o¤ered to merchants from di¤erent cities of origin, although
this practice was typically limited to specic times and circumstances (Ogilvie, 2011, p. 108). Similarly, it should
be clear that alien merchant guilds were also subject to some control and supervision by their host polities.
2For a rich and detailed informal account of merchant guilds, local and alien, see Ogilvie (2011). Our work and
hers build to some extent on the extensive review of historical evidence presented in Dessí and Ogilvie (2004).
2
of agents for this purpose. The taxation of trade was costly and ine¢ cient, with many tolls levied
in markets, as well as ports, river crossings, and other points of transit. We develop a repeated
game between the ruler of a medieval polity and a large number of (local) merchants to show how
merchant guilds emerged as a mechanism to foster cooperation between merchants and rulers,
raising revenue for the latter more e¢ ciently: merchant guilds were exempted from paying tolls,
and made direct transfers to rulers. This apparently straightforward alternative to reliance on
tax collectors was far from simple to implement. In order to raise enough revenue for rulers,
guild members had to secure collusive prots from trade. We study the conditions under which
such collusion could be sustained, and its implications.
E¤ective collusion required that only guild members be authorized to trade, hence the grant-
ing of exclusive trading rights by rulers to merchant guilds. But, these exclusive rights had to
be enforced, and used protably. We identify two main channels through which guildssocial
capital a¤ected the sustainability of collusion. When applied to groups or networks, such as
merchant guilds, the notion of social capital3 typically refers to cohesion and trust among mem-
bers, and to their resulting ability to enforce group norms and engage in e¤ective collective
action. In our model, social capital facilitates cooperation among guild members to achieve two
important objectives: rst, detecting and intervening to defeat attempts by non-members to
undermine the guilds monopoly over trade; second, coordinating on prot-maximizing market
strategies for the group, and appropriate punishments of any member who chooses to deviate.
By reducing the cost of e¤ective collusion, greater guild social capital tends to make granting
recognition and privileges to guilds more attractive for the ruler. On the other hand, greater
social capital within a guild also increases its bargaining power vis-à-vis the ruler (reecting
the greater degree of cohesion among guild members), allowing the guild to secure a part of the
collusive prots it generates.
Our theory identies a number of other important determinants, beyond the guilds social
capital, of the rulers choice between the merchant guild regime and the tax collector regime:
these include the strength and uncertainty of consumer demand, the geographical and population
characteristics of the polity, and the degree of patience of the merchants. The model therefore
yields a rich set of empirical predictions: we confront these with the available historical evidence
in Sections 5 and 6, where they help to shed light on the timing and variation of emergence of
merchant guilds; on their organization, norms and behavior; on their relationship with rulers
and their role in the development of medieval towns and their administration; and nally on
their decline.
The welfare implications of merchant guilds are complex. Our model shows that only those
with su¢ cient social capital would have been granted recognition and privileges by rulers, since
3For denitions see, among others, Bourdieu (1986); Coleman (1990); Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000); Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote (2002); Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004); Lin (2001); Putnam (2000); Sobel (2002);
Spagnolo (1999). It should be noted, though, that social capital in our analysis is modeled as an exogenous feature
of a group (guild), since we are interested in how equilibrium choices by rulers vary when faced with merchant
associations possessing di¤erent characteristics and di¤erent degrees of cohesion among members.
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they represented a less costly way of raising revenue than reliance on tax collectors. In this
sense, merchant guilds represented an e¢ ciency improvement relative to the taxation alternatives
available at the time. From the perspective of consumers, we show that the merchant guild
regime implied the same level of consumer prices as the tax collector regime, except when
demand realizations were large enough to require guild members to coordinate on a price below
the monopoly price: in this case, consumers were better o¤ under the guild regime. These
implications are favorable to merchant guilds. On the other hand, the guildssocial capital may
also have had less favorable welfare implications. Our model highlights one of these: e¤ective
collusion implied an upper bound on guild membership, which in some circumstances involved
membership restrictions and exclusion. At the same time, the guildssocial capital, by increasing
their bargaining power, enabled them to secure a share of collusive prots (net of transfers to
the ruler). This generated inequality within the merchant class, with guilded merchants earning
much more than other merchants who were excluded from trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short introduction
to merchant guilds and to the medieval taxation of trade, which motivates our model. Section 3
sets out the baseline model. Section 4 studies taxation and trade, and the conditions to sustain
collusion. The choice between the tax-collector regime and the guild regime is rst analyzed in
Section 5. This section also reviews the historical evidence on the models predictions. We then
extend the model in a variety of ways in Section 6, and discuss the evidence on the resulting
additional implications. The nal Section 7 compares our theory to alternative theories of the
emergence of merchant guilds, and o¤ers our concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Motivating evidence
This section briey reviews the historical evidence on merchant guilds and on the taxation of
trade in the Middle Ages, which motivates our model.
2.1 Medieval merchant guilds
Medieval merchant guilds were associations of merchants in a particular town or city. The
merchants could be wholesale and retail sellers, and trade one or more types of good, including
spices4, wine, grain, timber, furs, herring, honey, textiles5, bullion, etc. Some guilds included
members active in production as well as trade: historians often refer to these as craft guilds but
the distinction is blurred, as noted by Epstein (1991, p. 130), Within many craft guilds were
rules on the conduct of retail trade and signs that some masters had transformed themselves
4According to Lopez and Raymond (2001, pp. 108-114), the term spicescame to include not only seasonings,
perfumes, dyestu¤s and medicinals, but also a much wider variety of goods. The list they present, from Pegolottis
manual of commercial practice dated between 1310 and 1340, includes obvious candidates such as anise, ginger,
cinnamon, cloves, fennel, pepper and nutmeg, but also items as varied as asphalt, wax, glue, gum, indigo, ivory,
lead, tin, rice, copper, coral, soap, sugar, sulphur, turpentine.
5Notably cotton, wool, and silk.
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into wealthy merchants... In a sense, all craftsmen selling to the public were merchants... a
sharp line does not separate the craft and merchant guilds. For the purposes of our model,
what matters is trade: thus our analysis applies mainly to merchant guilds(whose members
specialized in trade), but can also be applied to those craft guildswhose members engaged
signicantly in retail trade, as well as di¤erent aspects of production. It does not, on the other
hand, apply to craft guilds whose members specialized in production and sold their output to
merchants (outside the guild).6
2.1.1 Local merchant guilds
Our model focuses mainly on local merchant guilds. Historically, most merchant guilds emerged
as associations of local merchants. These local merchant guilds were ubiquitous in medieval
Europe (in England alone, for example, there were over one hundred towns with a local merchant
guild).7 Local merchant guilds were supported by their local rulers, who granted them o¢ cial
recognition and a variety of important privileges, including exclusive rights over local trade.8
These privileges were sometimes granted as part of charters given to towns, which also gave
the towns a degree of political, administrative and nancial autonomy. This was the case in
England, where many such town charters contained a clause similar to the following: We grant
a Gild Merchant with a hanse and other customs belonging to the Gild, so that [or and that]
no one who is not of the Gild may merchandise in the said town, except with the consent of
the burgesses... (Gross, 1890, p. 8). Thus English local merchant guilds were granted the
right to exclude any non-member from trade. In continental Europe, the granting of monopoly
privileges to local merchant guilds was not always linked to the granting of greater political
autonomy to towns. A good example is the guild of the mercatores aque (water merchants) in
Paris: in 1170, the French king, Philip Augustus, granted them a virtual monopoly of the Seine
tra¢ c between the bridges of Paris and Mantes...they increasingly assumed the responsibilities of
municipal government under Philips grandson, Louis IX...The water merchants may be regarded
as the embryo of the municipal government recognized later in the century.(Baldwin, 1986, p.
348). Yet under Philip Augustus, Unlike those of most towns in the royal domain, the bourgeois
of Paris were permitted no semblance of autonomy(Baldwin, 1986, p. 349 and Luchaire, 1902,
p. 239).
6Richardson (2001, pp. 233-234) contrasts three types of craft guilds. The rst, manufacturing guilds,
produced consumer goods and sold most of their merchandise to merchants who resold it. These are essentially
guilds who specialized in production. The second type provided local services (e.g., innkeepers), while the third
type provided victuals. Richardson (2004, p. 13) then argues that manufacturing guilds did not possess rights
to be sole sellers. This is entirely consistent with our analysis, since rulers could extract surplus from trade by
giving exclusive rights to merchants, in return for transfers.
7See Gross (1890, pp. 9-16), for a list of all those for which there is explicit documentary evidence, many
dating back at least to the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The actual number is likely to have been even greater,
implying that by the thirteenth century, local merchant guilds were one of the most prevalent and characteristic
features of English municipalities.(p. 22).
8See Bernard (1972, p. 304), Dilcher (1984, pp. 72-76), Ehbrecht (1985, pp. 430, 449), Fryde (1985, p. 220),
Schütt (1980, p. 79). For reviews and discussions, see Dessí and Ogilvie (2004), Ogilvie (2011).
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The privileges granted to local merchant guilds in many medieval European cities meant
that alien merchants could be either excluded from trade, or allowed to trade only subject to
a number of restrictions clearly intended to favor local merchants.9 Among the most common
of these restrictions were staple rights and brokerage rights. Local guildsrights of staple
meant that alien merchants had to bring their merchandise to municipal warehouses where
members of the local merchant guild could buy them at favorable prices.10 Local guildsbrokerage
rights meant that alien merchants could not trade directly with consumers or with other alien
merchants: they had to use members of the local merchant guild as intermediaries (brokers).11
Local merchant guilds also restricted access to towns: Outsiders might enter and leave the
town for purposes of wholesale trading only and for only a limited number of days, varying from
place to place to between 14 and 40.12 At the same time, local merchant guilds could exclude
from trade local individuals who were not members of the guild.13 In some cases, they could
also benet from market regulations that gave them a large competitive advantage relative to
local producers.14
2.1.2 Alien merchant guilds
Some local merchant guilds established foreign branches (colonies15 and consulates)16 in
important trade centers, when a signicant number of their members engaged in long-distance
trade (many did not). These alien merchant guilds17 were closely linked to the local merchant
guilds of their polities of origin: for example, merchants from a given town or city typically had
to be members of the local merchant guild in their town or city in order to become members
of any of its branches in other towns or cities, and being expelled from the local guild of their
town or city of origin also entailed exclusion from all the alien merchant guilds linked to it.18
9See Hibbert (1963, pp. 169-74), Irsigler (1985, p. 59), Leguay (2000, p. 121), Planitz (1940, p. 25), Postan
(1973, pp. 189-91), Reyerson (2000, pp. 59-60), Schultze (1908, pp. 498-502, 506, 523, 526-7), Spu¤ord (2000, p.
177).
10Bernard (1972, p. 302); Kuske (1939).
11Bernard (1972, p. 302), Choroskevic (1996, pp. 84-6), Hibbert (1963, p. 170), Schultze (1908, pp. 498-502,
506, 523, 526-7), Spu¤ord (2000, p. 177).
12Fryde (1985, p. 220).
13Fryde (1985, p. 220), Planitz (1940, pp. 25-8), Postan (1973, pp. 189-91); Schütt (1980, p. 121, pp. 398-9),
Schulze (1985), Woodward (2003, p. 3).
14See, for example, Boldorf (2009, p.180).
15The term merchant coloniesis also used to refer to merchant communities in the early modern period (see,
for example, Zakharov, Harlaftis and Katsiardi-Hering, 2012). Our focus is on the medieval period.
16See Dessí and Ogilvie (2004, p. 9), Ogilvie (2011, p. 94).
17For an analysis of a broader set of mercantile communities, including some with shared cultural beliefs but
no formal organization, see Gelderblom and Grafe (2010).
18Ogilvie (2011, pp. 108, 112).
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2.2 Medieval taxation of trade
The use of tolls or customs to tax trade in Europe can be traced back to the Roman imperial
custom system.19 This included taxes on sales transactions and taxes on goods in transit. Ad
valorem tax rates typically varied between 2% and 5%; there were also some xed payments.
Toll stations were situated at appropriate locations in the customs territories. Customs were
collected thanks to close cooperation between civil administration and the army.
From at least the third century onwards, foreign merchants were subject to tight controls. In
the Byzantine customs system, from the sixth century onwards, agents referred to as comerciarii
were responsible for the apotheke (customs housesor commercial hostels), where imported
goods were bought and sold, and taxes collected. O¢ cial seals were attached to merchandise
to prove that the appropriate tax had been paid. Under Charlemagne, trade was restricted
to specic public markets, active at particular times and locations (legitimus mercatus): royal
o¢ cials collected tolls from participating merchants.
In the post-Carolingian Middle Ages, when central authority was weakened and power dis-
persed, we nevertheless nd many of the same basic features of trade taxation. Throughout
medieval Europe, rulers tried to restrict trade to public markets, including a multitude of o¢ -
cial fairs20, to ensure taxes could be collected.21 Tolls (customs, duties, subsidies) were collected
at coastal ports as well as river and road toll stations, and mountain passes.22
3 The baseline model
This section introduces our model. Consider a medieval polity with three types of risk-neutral
players: a ruler, N identical merchants, and a tax-collector.23
The market. Merchants sell a homogeneous good whose unit cost is normalized to zero and
compete to attract a single representative consumer. In every trading period  2 [1; ::;+1) they
quote prices. The consumer purchases one unit of the product. His utility from consumption is
u(v ; p ) = v   p ;
when (in period ) he buys at price p , and zero otherwise (we use the superscript  to indicate
time). The willingness to pay for the product v is a random variable identically and indepen-
19Our brief review of the early medieval taxation of trade, including its Roman background, draws substantially
on Middleton (2005).
20Probably the most famous example of medieval fairs is that of the Champagne fairs, but of course there were
very many other fairs and markets, including numerous local ones accommodating primarily local trade.
21See, for example, Dijkman (2011, pp. 46-47), and Middleton (2005, p. 320).
22See Middleton (2005) and Ormrod (1999, p. 32). For a broader review of medieval taxation (not focusing
specically on trade), see Bonney (1999).
23We explicitly focus on risk-neutral parties in order not to rely on risk-sharing mechanisms that have been
already analyzed in the network literature applied to economic history  see, e.g., Abramitzky (2008). We discuss
the relationship between our model and this literature in Section 6.
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dently distributed over time: for simplicity, it is equal to  > 0 with probability  and to 0
otherwise.
The ruler. The ruler governs the polity: he provides certain public goods, such as law enforce-
ment and defence, and nances these with various sources of revenue, including the taxation
of trade. He also spends on activities that provide him with private benets, such as military
campaigns and court display.24 For our purposes it is su¢ cient to treat his expenditures and
his other sources of revenue as given exogenously, and to focus on the revenue he can raise from
the taxation of trade. The ruler is assumed to maximize this revenue. This is a reasonable
assumption for the historical period under consideration, when rulers typically attached a low
weight to the well-being of ordinary consumers.25
To maximize his revenue from local trade, the ruler has two options. First, he can employ
a tax collector (see the discussion of tolls in Section 2). Second, he can grant recognition and
exclusive rights over trade to a merchant guild, in return for an appropriate transfer. These
are essentially, from a scal perspective, two alternative taxation regimes. Let us consider each
regime in turn, starting with the second option.
The guild. If the ruler chooses to grant recognition to a merchant guild, he endows it with
privileges, notably the power to exclude individual merchants from trade (see the discussion
of merchant guildsexclusive rights in Section 2). However, the exercise of this power is not
costless. Specically, there are two kinds of duty that guild members must perform in order
to enforce the guilds monopoly over trade and earn monopoly prots. First, when the guild
has size n < N , insiders must exclude outsiders from trade. We assume that this exclusion
e¤ort requires a total per-period investment equal to x(N   n), which is shared equally among
guild members. This cost obviously increases with the number of outsiders to be excluded. It
represents the cost of monitoring to detect any attempts by non-members to undermine the
guilds monopoly, and intervening to ensure the attempts are not successful. Greater cohesion
and trust among guild members (i.e., greater social capital) will reduce this cost, making it easier
to cooperate, communicate and avoid free-riding problems. In the baseline model we assume
that e¤ective exclusion is only possible if every member contributes  i.e., pays the individual
cost x (N   n) =n: then outsiders are unable to trade. Otherwise, outsiders can successfully
undercut the price that the guild members have agreed to charge. In the extensions to the
baseline model we show that our results continue to hold when we assume a di¤erent monitoring
technology, in which limited free-riding is less harmful.
The second type of duty required for the guild to operate successfully is an internal organi-
zation and coordination e¤ort. This entails a total per-period cost (n  1) f , which captures the
investment guild members must collectively sustain to coordinate successfully their actions 
i.e., the cost of dening and agreeing on their common market (pricing) strategy, of designing
24For historical evidence on the importance of these see, e.g., Brewer (1989).
25See, e.g., Bisson (2009, pp. 352-355).
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guild rules including a punishment code, of exchanging information, etc.26 We can think of this
to some extent as a time cost: guild members had to participate in collective activities, such as
meetings, social and religious gatherings, elections of guild o¢ cers, admission of new members,
and so on. Importantly, the disutility of spending time on these collective activities will be
lower in groups that have greater social capital, interpreted here as greater cohesion, closer ties,
and more congruent preferences. Moreover, more social capital within a guild will also make
coordination easier through greater trust and easier reliance on shared information. We will
return to this interpretation of f as reecting social capital below.
When the ruler grants recognition and privileges to a merchant guild, he requires an ex ante
fee RG, which is shared equally among the guilds members.27 This fee is set at the level which
solves a standard Nash-bargaining problem between the ruler and the guild with weights  and
1  , respectively.28
The tax-collector. In the absence of merchant organizations, the ruler delegates trade taxation
to an agent: the tax-collector. Specically, he endows the agent with the right to collect taxes
on trade in the polity, in return for an ex ante royalty fee RT . This is essentially tax farming,
a very widespread practice in medieval Europe  see, e.g., Lyon and Verhulst (1967), Webber
and Wildavsky (1986), Johnson and Koyama (2014). In every period, the tax-collector chooses
a tax t that merchants have to pay on each unit of product they sell. The tax revenue that
he can levy is t as long as trade occurs. Collecting taxes is costly, and the cost increases with
the revenue to be raised: for example, more time needs to be spent at public markets and toll
stations (see the discussion of medieval trade taxation in Section 2). We model this by assuming
that in every trading period  the tax collector pays a cost c (t ) =  t , with  2 [0; 1], which
is increasing in the revenue t that can be extracted from the merchants.
26The importance of sharing information and designing guild rules, including possible sanctions, aimed at
maximizing guild memberscollective prots can be readily appreciated from the following examples. In Silesia,
the rules for the town linen markets were designed to give guilded merchants a competitive advantage relative
to producers (weavers): The market regulations... restricted the time for purchasing to a few hours. When the
striking of the clock opened the market in midmorning, hundreds of weavers rushed to the central market square.
The houses of the wealthiest merchants were situated around the square, where they sat in front of their houses
on high chairs overlooking the crowd. The sellers came to the foot of the chairs to o¤er their pieces. From above,
the merchant checked the piece with a short glance and gave their price. If the weaver agreed, a chalk mark was
made on the linen... the weavers had little chance to get a good deal given the level of activity on the market
square. They ocked to the merchants chairs by the dozen and had to accept the prices o¤ered quickly. By
agreement within the guild, no merchant was allowed to make an o¤er for a piece once it was signed with chalk.
As the chalk mark could only be removed by washing the cloth, which was impossible given the restricted market
time, once a piece was marked, the weaver could not invite alternative o¤ers from other merchants. Postponing
the sale of a piece for a week was usually impossible because the weavers very often lived from hand to mouth and
were unable to store their linen. Thus, the guild members prevented competition within their ranks (Boldorf,
2009, p.180). The next example highlights the importance of information and punishments: in English towns,
alien merchants coming to trade were carefully watched, lest they should sell or buy under colour or cover of
a faithless gild brothers freedom, the latter being expelled from the fraternity or otherwise severely punished if
found guilty of this o¤ence(Gross, 1890, p. 48).
27As will be discussed in the next section, guild members typically paid some entry fees, as well as a variety of
other dues. The guild then made transfers to the ruler.
28Greater cohesion among guild members (more social capital) will increase their ability to bargain successfully
with the ruler, increasing their share of collusive prots via a lower .
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Payments to rulers and commitment. We assume that the ruler can commit to the chosen
taxation regime at  = 0, so that in both regimes payments to rulers take the simple form of a
single ex-ante fee. This makes it possible to identify clearly some of the key trade-o¤s between
recognizing a guild and relying on a tax collector, abstracting from commitment problems. We
discuss the implications of imperfect commitment in the section on extensions to the baseline
model.
Timing and strategies. At time  = 0 the ruler decides whether to grant recognition to
a merchant guild or hire an agent as tax-collector. In every trading period   1 the game
proceeds as follows:
 Demand is realized;
 Merchants quote prices;
 Trade takes place.
There is perfect monitoring: if a guild member deviates by undercutting in any period, the
other members observe the identity of the deviating brother by the end of that period. This
assumption seems reasonable in the case of medieval polities. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2,
most of the trading activities at that time were taking place in public markets where merchants
could easily monitor each others pricing strategy.
All agents have a common discount factor  2 [0; 1). The equilibrium concept is subgame
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). Finally, in the baseline model we assume that
  (N   1)max

x;
f


: (A1)
This assumption simply allows for the possibility of a single-member guild  i.e., the revenue
that can be obtained from trade is greater than the cost of excluding all but one merchant  and
a guild that includes every merchant in the polity  the (expected) revenue is greater than the
operating costs when all merchants are admitted to membership of the guild. In the extensions
to the baseline model and in the Appendix we will relax this hypothesis.
4 The basic trade-o¤ facing revenue-maximizing rulers
We begin by characterizing the prot that the ruler can achieve when merchants are not orga-
nized in a guild, and then proceed to examine the role of guilds.
4.1 Trade and taxation in the absence of merchant guilds
Suppose that the ruler hires an agent entitled to impose taxation and collect the corresponding
revenue. The tax rate is chosen to maximize the revenue from taxation. We will solve the game
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using a backward-induction logic. Assume that t  0 is the per-unit tax that merchants have
to pay in period  . In that period merchant i earns a prot equal to
i (p
 ) = Di (p
 ) (pi   t ) ;
where p  (p1 ; ::; pN ) 2 <N+ is the vector of prices quoted by the N competing merchants in
period  . Merchant-is individual demand is
Di (p
 ) 
(
0
1
#fj:pj=minfpgg
, pi > min fpg
, pi = min fpg
;
which is equal to 1M if M  N merchants (including i) quote the lowest market price and thus
share the consumers demand uniformly, and is equal to zero otherwise (we use the subscript i
to indicate merchants).29
The tax collector will optimally set t =  in every trading period in which v =  and
t = 0 otherwise, so as to implement the monopoly outcome. In fact, he has no incentive to
choose t lower than , because this would extract less than the monopoly prot. In addition,
setting t higher than  would also not be protable because  is the maximal prot that
merchants can (collectively) repay in every trading period. Hence, the tax collectors (expected)
intertemporal prot is
V T =
(1   )
1    0;
which is increasing in the consumers expected willingness to pay , and decreasing in the cost
of collecting taxes  . The ruler fully extracts this surplus by setting RT = V T .
4.2 Merchant guilds: trade, taxation and privileges
Suppose now that n  N merchants organize themselves as a group able to act in their collective
interest: the guild. The ruler grants privileges to them and, in particular, monopoly power over
trade  i.e., only members of the guild are o¢ cially authorized to trade. Under what conditions
can the guild implement a better outcome than the tax collector, from the rulers point of view?
To answer this question we must rst examine how the viability of e¤ective collusion among
guild members, yielding monopoly prots for the guild, depends on the parameters of the model,
and the implications this has for the guilds optimal size, as well as its performance relative to
the tax collector. Before providing the equilibrium analysis it is useful to frame the timing of
the game within each stage. The sequence of moves within every trading period  is as follows:
 Merchants decide whether to pay the operating cost or not.
 Demand is realized.
29The implicit assumption here is a uniform tie-breaking condition, which is standard in market games with
homogenous sellers.
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 Merchants simultaneously and independently quote prices and decide whether to pay the
exclusion cost.
 Prots are realized.
We will look for a SPNE of the game in which in every trading period guild members pay the
operating cost, while they exclude outsiders and charge the monopoly price pM =  if and only
if v = . Such an outcome can enforce the monopoly outcome as long as: (i) each merchant
does not prot from undercutting the monopoly price; (ii) it is in each merchants best interest
to pay both the operating and the exclusion costs. The punishment code is the simplest one
could imagine: following any deviation (be it a price deviation or simply free-riding on exclusion
and operating costs) the guild is dissolved and merchants price competitively  i.e., p = 0 
so that each obtains a prot equal to zero, which is the lowest payo¤ they can obtain. In this
sense the punishment is optimal. Alternatively, one could assume that if a member deviates, the
other guild members exclude the deviating member at the cost of x, and continue to operate the
guild, colluding to set the monopoly price without him. This punishment code will be preferred
if it is more protable for the guild members that do not deviate. In both cases the deviating
member is punished with a zero payo¤. Thus, our equilibrium analysis does not hinge on the
specic way the zero-prot punishment is enforced after deviation.
The equilibrium described above must be immune to three types of deviations. First, every
guild member should be willing to pay his share of the guilds operating (organization and
coordination) costs. This will be the case as long as the continuation value of doing so is
positive  i.e., each members expected prot is non-negative on equilibrium path
 (  x (N   n))  (n  1) f
n
 0 ,   x (N   n) + (n  1)

f: (1)
Second, every guild member should be willing to contribute to the exclusion e¤ort. Given
that the guild cannot make prots if the exclusion cost is not entirely paid, it is easy to show
that each merchant will contribute as long as
  x (N   n) ;
which is obviously implied by (1).
Third, no guild member should be tempted to undercut the others. Formally, undercutting
the monopoly price is not protable as long as the following self-enforceability constraint holds
  x (N   n)
n
+

1  

 (  x (N   n))  (n  1) f
n

   x (N   n)
n
: (2)
The left-hand side captures the (discounted) expected gain from cooperation, while the right-
hand side is the spot gain from deviation. The continuation payo¤ after deviation is zero given
the guilds punishment code. Note that (2) implies (1). Hence, undercutting in the positive
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demand state is the only deviation that must be taken into account. Of course, deviations are
not feasible when the demand state is low  see Section 6 for an extension of the model to a
continuous demand state.
Rearranging condition (2), it follows that collusion is sustainable as long as
 (n)  
1   [  x(N   1)]| {z }
0 by A1
  (n  1)

+

1   (f   x)

 0:
Notice that the impact of the guild density n on the self-enforceability constraint is ambiguous.
In fact, di¤erentiating with respect to n we have
@ (n)
@n
 0 , x  x  f

+
(1  )

:
This expression suggests that there are three e¤ects shaping the way a higher density n
impacts the incentive to undercut the monopoly price. First, other things being equal, as n
grows larger each guild member is more tempted to undercut pM because the monopoly prot
must be shared among more people  i.e., the individual revenue from collusion =n becomes
smaller as n increases. Second, operating costs are increasing in guild size, thus a higher n , by
increasing coordination costs, tends to make collusion less appealing because the continuation
value of cooperation shrinks. Third, a higher density reduces the cost of excluding outsiders,
which (other things being equal) tends to make collusion easier to sustain since it increases the
continuation value of cooperation. This e¤ect becomes stronger when the cost of excluding each
outsider x grows larger. It should be noted that  and  have a quite di¤erent impact on x: a
higher  tends to reduce it, while a higher  increases it. Thus  and  play a di¤erent role in
the analysis.
Summing up, while the rst and second e¤ects point in the direction of making collusion
harder to sustain when n increases, the third e¤ect goes in the opposite direction. We can
therefore establish the following result.
Lemma 1 If x  x collusion is always viable in the guild regime regardless of n. Otherwise,
collusion can be sustained if, and only if,
n  n  1 +   x (N   1)
x  x ;
where n decreases with f , and increases with , , x and .
This result shows that if the exclusion cost x is su¢ ciently large, the third e¤ect described
above dominates  i.e., when x  x larger guilds are more protable because they are able to
better minimize total exclusion costs. Hence, as the number of insiders grows larger it is easier to
sustain the monopoly outcome, meaning that as long as a single-member guild is viable (as stated
13
in assumptionA1)30 the monopoly outcome is sustainable regardless of guild size. When instead
exclusion costs are not so important and the other two e¤ects dominate, there is an endogenous
upper-bound on guild size  i.e., n  n. Essentially, guilds that are excessively dense bear high
coordination costs and are less able to deter price deviations. Hence, collusion is viable only if
the guild density is not too large. This constraint becomes tighter when coordination costs are
higher, as reected by a larger f ; it softens instead when the probability of being in a positive
demand state increases, as reected by a higher ; when the market becomes more valuable, as
reected by a higher ; when merchants become more patient, which is captured by a higher
discount factor ; or when exclusion is more costly, as reected by a higher x. For simplicity,
hereafter we assume (without loss of insights) that N > n.
The guild density is chosen so as to solve the following maximization problem
max
1nN
 (  x (N   n))  (n  1) f
1   ;
subject to  (n)  0.
Note that the impact of the density on the guilds objective function is ambiguous. When
n increases the cost of excluding outsiders shrinks: insiders need to exclude fewer outsiders.
However, as the number of insiders grows larger the guilds operating cost also increases since
coordination becomes more expensive. Hence, the guilds objective function is increasing in n
if, and only if,
x  x  f

:
As we have already shown above, the impact of the density on the self-enforceability constraint is
ambiguous too. This makes the choice of the guilds size a non-obvious problem. The key insight
is that while the objective function is increasing in n as long as x  x, the self-enforceability
constraint (2) softens as a response to a higher n if x  x > x, meaning that even if exclusion
costs are large enough to induce a positive relationship between the guilds expected prot and
its density, it may well be the case that a larger density amplies each members incentive to
undercut the monopoly price  i.e., x  x.
Let n be the optimal density and denote by W (n) the value function associated with the
guilds maximization problem. In the next proposition we examine how the tension between the
two e¤ects just described shapes the optimal guild size.
Proposition 2 The solution of the guilds maximization problem has an interior solution n =
n 2 (1; N) if, and only if, x 2 (x; x): Otherwise, it features a corner solution  i.e., n = 1
when x  x and n = N when x  x.
Hence, the guilds ability to exclude outsiders plays a crucial role in the trade-o¤ discussed
above. This ability will depend on several factors, including the geographical and population
30We consider the case in which this assumption is violated in the section that examines extensions to the
baseline model.
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characteristics of the polity, which may make it easier or harder to detect alien or excluded local
merchants who engage in unauthorized trade, as well as the politys openness to foreigners, and
its attractiveness to alien merchants. The ability to exclude non-members from trade will also
depend, on the other hand, on the degree of trust among guild members, and the extent to
which they are able to overcome free-riding incentives and cooperate to monitor and intervene
e¤ectively: in other words, on their social capital. Thus social capital a¤ects several parameters
in our model: greater social capital tends to reduce exclusion costs, parameterized by x, and
also coordination costs, parameterized by f , as discussed earlier.
In the following we will focus only on the most interesting case in which the optimal guilds
size is interior  i.e., x 2 (x; x) so that n = n  and neglect corner solutions, which are
less appealing from an historical perspective (see the Appendix for a complete characterization).
Solving the model backward, the Nash bargaining problem between the guild and the ruler is:
max
RG2<+
(RG   V T )  W (n) RG1  : (3)
where, as explained before, V T is the rulers outside option, which is the expected payo¤ he
would obtain by hiring a tax-collector. The outside option of the guild is zero since merchants
would make no prots if a tax-collector were hired. It is then immediate to verify that the
solution of (3) entails:
RG = V T + 

W (n)  V T  ;
which also denes the rulers prot from granting recognition and privileges to a guild.
5 Merchant guild versus tax-collector
Building on the previous results, we can now examine under which conditions the ruler prefers
to recognize a merchant guild rather than hiring a tax collector. Comparing RG and V T we nd
that
Proposition 3 Assume that n = n. There exists a threshold   2 (0; 1) such that the ruler
prefers to grant recognition to the guild if, and only, if    . The threshold   is increasing
in x, f and N , and decreasing in ,  and .
Intuitively, the rulers choice between the guild regime and the tax collector regime depends
on the costs associated with each. The guild regime can entail two types of cost, coordination
costs and exclusion costs, whose relative importance varies with guild size. These costs need
to be weighed against the cost of relying on an agent to collect taxes. Proposition 3 claries
this trade-o¤. It shows how the relative attractiveness of guilds depends both on their internal
characteristics  i.e., their social capital, which a¤ects f and x  and on characteristics of the
polity, which inuence current and expected future demand, as well as the number of potentially
active merchants, and the cost of excluding non-members from trade.
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Proposition 3 has clear-cut comparative statics predictions: merchant guilds are more likely
to emerge, other things being equal, when ; ,  and  are higher, and f , x and N lower.
Paucity of data for the historical period under consideration makes it very di¢ cult to verify
these empirically; nevertheless, it is possible to obtain some information from historical sources
such as charters granted by rulers, municipal records, court records, and guild statutes. We
consider evidence from such sources below, while emphasizing the important caveat that many
records and documents from the eleventh, twelth and thirteenth centuries (and of course earlier)
have been lost. Indeed, some of the important work carried out by medieval historians entailed
trying to infer information about lost documents from occasional references to such documents
in subsequent, surviving ones.
5.1 Predictions and historical evidence
Our model yields a number of implications for the emergence, operation and decline of merchant
guilds. We now review the historical evidence on these predictions. Other things being equal:
 Prediction 1 (Guild emergence): Guilds are more likely to emerge when the expected
protability of trade, represented by  and , is higher.
Historically, the European economy started to grow substantially in the eleventh century:
the period until the fourteenth century witnessed a dramatic increase in production, trade,
and consumer demand.31 This is the period when local merchant guilds emerged and became
widespread.32 Moreover, as the model would predict, merchant guilds were typically established
in towns, and not in smaller market centres, where trade yielded revenue for rulers through
tolls collected by o¢ cials.33 For example, merchant guilds were established early on in most
of the largest34 eleventh century towns in England, as estimated on the basis of data from
the Domesday Book (1086), such as Winchester, York, Lincoln, Oxford, Ipswich, Canterbury,
Gloucester, Nottingham, Leicester, Bury St. Edmunds, Dunwich, and Wallingford.35 Towns
such as Ludlow, Poole, and Weymouth, that began to develop during the twelth century, appear
to have been granted merchant guilds later on.36
Larger towns could be expected to have both higher  (larger market size), and higher 
(since greater economic diversication would tend to reduce the risk of very unfavorable demand
31Spruyt (1994, pp. 61-63).
32Dilcher (1984, pp. 72-76); Hickson and Thompson (1991, pp. 137-8); Woodward (2005, pp. 631-3). Inter-
estingly, as pointed out by Richardson and McBride (2009), mortality rates in much of this period were low,
suggesting that  was relatively high, which is also consistent with our model.
33For many examples of such smaller market centres, and their tolls, see Britnell (2000).
34A town with at least 2000 inhabitants was largeat the time.
35Gross (1890, pp. 9-16), gives the following dates for the earliest reference to these townsmerchant guilds:
Winchester (Henry II), York (1130-1), Lincoln (Henry II) , Oxford (Henry II), Ipswich (1200), Canterbury (1093-
1109), Gloucester (1200), Nottingham (c.1189), Leicester (1107-1118), Bury St. Edmunds (1198), Dunwich
(1200), Wallingford (Henry II). The mention Henry II refers to charters given by Henry II, King of England in
1154-89.
36Gross (1890, pp. 9-16), gives the following dates for the earliest reference to these townsmerchant guilds:
Weymouth (1442), Ludlow (1461), Poole (1568).
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states). For example, in his detailed study of the West Midlands of England, Dyer (1992, p.145)
notes how all of the towns had much in common, notably in their varied occupations  15
or 20 are recorded for some of the lesser towns, rising to 50 in the case of Worcester37... The
bigger towns gave opportunities for a wider range of specialists, as well as for traders on a
large scale. Note however that larger towns are also likely to have had a larger population
of potentially active merchants, N . Thus we would expect guilds in these towns to have had
plenty of social capital, enabling them to be either large and inclusive, yet able to coordinate
easily and successfully (i.e., low f), or more exclusive, with fewer, well-organized members able
to cooperate successfully and deter any attempts by non-members to undermine their monopoly
over trade (i.e., low x). We therefore turn to the evidence on social capital.
 Prediction 2 (Social capital): Guilds are more likely to be granted recognition if they
possess more social capital, represented by lower x (cost of exclusion) and f (cost of
coordination), enabling them to coordinate e¢ ciently their strategies and sustain their
monopoly prots.
Merchant guilds were social networks whose members participated in a variety of social
and religious activities together; they held regular assemblies and feasts; when abroad, they
lived in their own quarters of foreign cities and interacted closely. At home as well as abroad,
they provided mutual assistance when in di¢ culty.38 Close and repeated interaction facilitated
monitoring and the exchange of information, helping to build and sustain trust and cohesion.
The historical evidence from surviving records shows that merchant guild members cooperated
to enforce and protect their exclusive rights. They did this in a variety of ways. Their exclusive
rights, granted at earlier dates, were sometimes challenged in subsequent periods, and merchant
guild members cooperated to defend them in court. For example, In 1330 the major and
community of the town of Bedford were summoned to answer to the king by what warrant they
claim to have a Gild Merchant... so that anyone who is not of that Gild may not merchandise....
In reply to the summons, the burgesses show a charter of Richard I, granting a Gild Merchant...
and argue their case.39 Similar examples are available for other merchant guilds.40 There are
also records of merchant guild members intervening directly to enforce their exclusive rights,
and then defending their intervention in court when challenged.41 For example, In 1280 several
burgesses of Newcastle-under-Lyme were summoned by the king for seizing ten eeces of wool
belonging to Richard the Baker of Sta¤ord... They say that they seized Richards wool because
he bought it contrary to the liberty of the Gild; and they show a charter of Henry III....42
37Our note: Worcester indeed had a merchant guild.
38Coornaert (1948, p. 218); Gross (1890, pp. 34-5).
39Gross, 1890, p. 37. Note that Richard I was King of England in 1189-1199.
40For example, Chester, Beaumaris, Conway, Bala, Newborough, Carnarvon, Harlech, Criccieth, Maccleseld
(Gross, 1890, pp. 38-39, 42).
41 It is precisely thanks to surviving court records that we have this kind of evidence. It seems likely that many
such cases were unchallenged and hence unrecorded.
42Gross (1890, p. 39). Note that Henry III was king of England in 1216-1272. Gross (p. 14) gives 1235 as the
earliest reference to the merchant guild of Newcastle-under-Lyme.
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Merchant guilds often opposed powerful lords: for example, Alan Basset lord of Wycombe...
attempted to get rid of the gild merchant and allow free trade in hides and wool in the town.
The burgesses, in this case synonymous with the gild, brought an action against him in the
Kings Court (Curia Regis) claiming that they had their gild merchant by charter from King
John.43
Merchant guild members successfully coordinated on prot-maximizing strategies vis-à-vis
alien merchants. This did not always entail complete exclusion - in particular, restrictions were
often relaxed on particular days, no one, except a gildsman, shall buy honey, suet, salt herring,
nor any kind of oil, nor mill-stones, nor fresh leather, nor any kind of fresh skins; nor keep a wine-
tavern, nor sell cloth by retail, except on market and fair day.44 As Gross points out, gildsmen
were enlightened enough to perceive that more complete freedom of trade on those days attracted
a greater multitude of people... and thus conduced to their commercial prosperity.45 Yet guild
members often enjoyed preemption rights: for example, the Southampton ordinances dictated
that no simple inhabitant nor stranger shall bargain for nor buy any kind of merchandise
coming to the town before burgesses of the Gild Merchant.46
Thus successful coordination and cooperation by guild members required elaboration and
implementation of more complex strategies when dealing with alien merchants than simply
xing prices by guild members and excluding everyone else. These also included requirements
for alien merchants to bring their wares to the Common Hallor other specied public place,
and there expose them for sale, in order that their goods could be more easily examined, and
their mercantile transactions more readily supervised.47 Moreover, alien merchants were often
restricted to a maximum number of days they could remain in the town, and during this time
they were carefully watched, lest they should sell or buy under... cover of a faithless gild-brothers
freedom, the latter being expelled from the fraternity or otherwise severely punished, if found
guilty of this o¤ence.48
Coordination and cooperation among guild members was further enhanced by a variety of
guild norms; for example, the gildsman was generally under obligation to share all purchases
with his brethren, that is to say, if he bought a quantity of a given commodity, any other
gildsmen could claim a portion of it at the same price at which he purchased it.49
 Prediction 3 (Guild decline): Guilds are more likely to decline when the cost of relying
on agents to collect taxes ( ) decreases, and when characteristics of the polity make it
harder for guilds to enforce their monopolies over trade (increasing x and/or f).
43The quotation is from Fryde (1985, p. 222), citing as source: Curia Regis Rolls of the Reign of Henry III,
vol. XI, 7-9 Henry III (London 1955), p. 415, no. 2055.
44Extract from the ordinances of Southampton, cited by Gross (1890, p. 47).
45Gross (1890, p. 47).
46Gross (1890, p .48).
47Gross (1890, p. 47).
48Gross (1890, p. 48).
49Gross (1890, p. 49). For many more examples, see Dessí and Ogilvie (2004) and Ogilvie (2011).
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The timing of merchant guildsdecline varied across countries. According to Ogilvie (2011,
pp. 31), it started after about 1500, although for a long time... largely restricted to two
areas of Europe - the Low Countries (modern Belgium and the Netherlands) and England.50
The reasons for merchant guildsdecline are a matter of debate among historians - there were
in all probability multiple reasons. Can our model shed any light on the decline of merchant
guilds? We consider three important examples below: England, the Low Countries, and northern
Germany.
England. Schoeld (2004) highlights the increasing importance of the directly assessed
subsidy in England during the sixteenth century. This was an individual tax, "levied upon the
assessed wealth of each taxpayer" (p. 2). Schoeld shows how this tax evolved from a means to
raise revenue in extraordinary circumstances (typically times of war or imminent war) to a more
generally acceptable contribution to the funding of government. The timing is of considerable
interest: "the act of 1534 is revolutionary in that it is the rst act that justies parliamentary
taxation primarily in terms of the civil benets conferred on the realm by the excellence of the
kings government" (p. 13 ). In terms of our model, the evolution of this tax can be thought of
as equivalent to a reduction in  , which makes it consistent with merchant guild decline starting
in the 16th century.51
Evidence on changes in the cost of enforcing merchant guildsmonopolies in England is
harder to obtain directly. However, we do know that there was signicant trading activity in the
countryside, in informal as well as formal trading centres: Dyer (1992) discusses many examples
of this hidden tradefor the 14th, 15th and 16th centuries. Opportunities for merchants excluded
from guilds to prot from such trade must have been limited early on. They must have grown
substantially between 1300 and 1600, because of the following changes reviewed by Britnell
(2000, pp. 12-13): (i) a severe reduction in the proportion of the population who might be
classied as cotters or labourers (i.e. the poorer families); (ii) a rising standard of living in
rural society, associated with an increased demand for merchant wares; (iii) an increasing
propensity of consumers to buy goods from abroad; (iv) the increasing importance of exported
manufactures for English employment and national income. Moreover, export-led production
increased not only in large towns, but also in small towns and rural areas. For example, if we
look at English cloth52 production, we nd that In the rst signicant phase of export growth
between 1350 and 1400 the chief beneciaries were older towns... In the second main phase from
50Ogilvie (2011) focuses on the guilds gradual loss of power and decline. See also Hickson and Thompson
(1991), who focus instead on one step in this process of decline, the elimination of guild entry restrictions.
51Johnson and Koyama (2014) also draw attention to how, following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Eng-
lish state borrowed on a new scale; Parliament gained control of expenditure and, from 1693 onwards, guaranteed
loan repayment; the Bank of England, formed in 1694, began to issue long-term loans which now comprised a
national debt... and a secondary market grew up that securitized this new debt. As we shall see below, one of
the ways in which merchant guilds beneted medieval rulers, in return for their privileges, was the provision of
large loans that helped to alleviate their nancing constraints. The increased ability to borrow from other sources
in the 18th century thus further reduced the value of merchant guilds to the English state.
52Cloth became one of Englands most important exports.
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the 1470s the chief beneciaries were the rural or small-town industries of western Wiltshire,
Devon and elsewhere.53
In sum, higher rural demand must have created protable opportunities for merchants, in-
cluding merchants who were not guild members, who could sell imported goods to rural in-
habitants, buy from them goods to be sold abroad, and increasingly trade with them goods
produced in di¤erent parts of the country. Indeed, by the sixteenth century, we observe a sub-
stantial development of mercantilenetworks "that made it advantageous for artisans to live
in particular towns and industrial villages, especially if they were producing goods in demand
over considerable distances. Local trade between village weaver and village tanner had given
way, in part, to trade over longer distances with merchant intermediaries... non-agricultural
activity grew in rural areas, but it was characteristically more merchant-dependent than in the
thirteenth century.54
In other words, merchant guildscosts of preventing non-members from undermining their
prots (x) increased substantially by the sixteenth century - which is consistent with merchant
guild decline starting in this period. As we have seen, improvements in taxation further tilted
the balance against merchant guilds, contributing to their decline.
The Low Countries. The Low Countries are the other area of Europe where, according to
Ogilvie (2011, p. 31), merchant guilds declined after about 1500. Although the context was
di¤erent from England, here too local merchant guilds faced increasing costs of preventing non-
members from undermining their prots (x): according to Gelderblom (2013), neighbouring
cities competed ercely to attract foreign merchants, because of their geographical position at
the heart of the European international trading network. A good example is given by Bruges, the
rst city in the Low Countries to emerge as a major international commercial centre. Bruges
faced little competition from other cities in the Low Countries until the development of the
Brabant fairs in Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom starting in the fourteenth century.55 By the mid-
fteenth century, Hundreds of artisans and merchants, local and foreign, regularly traveled to
Brabant56, and by the end of the century, Antwerp had overtaken Bruges57. This is consistent
with merchant guild decline beginning in the sixteenth century.
As for taxation, Fritschy (2003) discusses the "tax revolution" in Holland in the sixteenth
century, leading to a dramatic increase in revenue from 1574 onwards. This can be interpreted
in terms of a reduction in  in our model, further contributing to merchant guild decline.
The German Hanse. Northern Germany, on the other hand, is one of the examples typically
given of slower decline of merchant guilds. In this part of Europe a large number of cities, rather
than competing with each other, had formed a powerful association, the Hanseatic League
53Britnell (2000, p. 14).
54Britnell (2000, pp. 20-21).
55See Gelderblom (2013, pp. 20; 25-26).
56Gelderblom (2013, p. 27).
57Gelderblom (2013, p. 15).
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(Hanse). By coordinating their actions, the members of the German Hanse were able to obtain
substantial commercial privileges for their merchants trading in northern Europe58, acquiring a
dominant position in Baltic trade. Merchant guild members in Hanse cities continued to earn the
resulting prots from trade until eventually the rise of Dutch and English shipping undermined
their monopoly.
The timing of decline is summarized by Lindberg (2009, p. 609): By the end of the fteenth
century, the Dutch had a clear dominance over Baltic trade, although the richest trades, such
as spices, remained in the hands of the Hansa merchants. After the fall of Antwerp, in 1585,
Amsterdam emerged as northern Europes economic centre, and Dutch control of the Baltic
spice trade during this period marked the end of the dominant rule of the Hanseatic cities
within European trade. Thus the cost of preventing non-members from undermining their
prots (x) increased gradually over a long period of time for the local merchant guilds of the
Hanseatic cities, and decline was correspondingly slow.59
As for taxation, Hanseatic cities followed di¤erent paths over time, belonging to di¤erent
territories and jurisdictions (empire, di¤erent kinds of kingdom, duchy, archbishopric, princi-
pality, etc.). Dincecco (2009) shows that in Prussia, where some of them ended up, per capita
revenues remained substantially lower than in Britain or the Netherlands until the 19th century,
which is also consistent with a slower decline of merchant guilds.
 Prediction 4 (Guilds, rulers and transfers): Guilds will make transfers to rulers in
return for their privileges, and they will be exempted from tolls imposed by tax collectors.
In our model, under the guildregime, merchant guild members are exempted from taxation
by a tax collector, and use (part of) their collusive prots to make direct transfers to rulers.
The historical evidence shows that merchant guilds were indeed granted exemptions from
a variety of tolls and other taxes, and made direct transfers to their rulers.60 In England, for
example, the same town charters that granted legal recognition and monopoly privileges to the
local merchant guild generally granted exemptions from all tolls and other taxes, in exchange
for a xed sum or farm (rma burgi) to be paid annually by the town to the ruler (Gross, 1890).
Membership of the local merchant guild carried corresponding duties and benets: chief among
the obligations was participation in the towns assessments and payment of pecuniary charges,
which ensured that the rma burgi was duly paid and the privileges granted in the charter
maintained. On the benet side, local guild members enjoyed the right to trade freely and were
58See for example Dollinger (1970, pp. 189-190) on the privileges obtained by the German Hanse in England
and Flanders.
59On the other hand, once the cost became high because the network of alternative trading centres and trading
routes had developed su¢ ciently, attempts by local merchant guilds to enforce local monopolies ultimately led
to stagnation and decline (for examples, see Lindberg (2009, 2010) on Lubeck and Konigsberg, two of the most
important Hanseatic cities).
60For examples see, among others, Ehbrecht (1985, pp. 425-6), on Germany; Ho¤mann (1980, p.49), on
Denmark; Racine (1985, pp. 135-6), on Italy; Smith (1940, pp. 48, 64-5, 85), and Woodward (2005, pp. 631-4)
on Spain.
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generally exempt from all tolls, while unfranchised merchants, when allowed to practise their
vocation, were hemmed in on every side by onerous restrictions. Of these the most irksome was
probably the payment of toll on all wares that they were permitted to buy or sell, Gross (1890).
In Flanders, a similar pattern can be observed from the early twelth century: the town of St.
Omer obtained freedom from all tolls and other taxes in 1128 in return for a xed annual sum
or farm.61 The local merchant guild in St. Omer enjoyed a variety of monopolistic privileges
and contributed to the provision of local public goods.
There is evidence of direct cash transfers made by local merchant guilds to rulers throughout
Europe, from England and Germany to Italy and Spain.62 In addition to direct cash transfers,
other forms of transfer were widespread, yielding substantial benets for rulers. Thus local mer-
chant guilds provided valuable assistance with the collection of trade taxes (taxes on merchants
that were not exempt).63 They also helped to alleviate medieval rulersnancing constraints
by providing large loans, at a time when borrowing large amounts was not easy for rulers.64
Finally, local merchant guilds were an important source of naval and military assistance, and
political support, for medieval rulers.65
5.2 Additional implications and historical evidence
Beyond the predictions just discussed, our analysis yields several other implications. We now
discuss these, together with the historical evidence on them.
 Prediction 5 (Exclusive membership and merchant inequality): Guilds may im-
pose restrictions on membership, and these may generate wealth inequality among mer-
chants
In our model, the negative implications of guilds for equality among merchants arise when
the following three conditions are satised: (i) the optimal guild size falls short of the total
number of potentially active merchants (i.e., n < N); (ii) the merchant guild generates a
surplus relative to the revenues that would be raised by a tax collector (i.e., W (n) > V T ); (iii)
the merchant guild has su¢ cient social capital, and hence bargaining power, to secure part of
61See Lyon and Verhulst (1967).
62Dagron (2002, p.408); Fresheld (1938, p. 17); Kohn (2003, p.44); Lloyd (1977, p. 120); Racine (1985, pp.
135-6, 139); Schütt (1980, pp. 112-21); Smith (1940, pp. 48, 64-5); Woodward (2005, pp. 631-4). For reviews
and discussions see Dessí and Ogilvie (2004, pp. 38-39) and Ogilvie (2011, p. 169).
63Ashtor (1983, pp. 73-4, 271-83); Bernard (1972, p. 327); Fryde (1959, pp. 2-8); Ormrod (2000, p. 292);
Postan (1987, p. 293); Smith (1940, pp. 61-4, 86); Woodward (2005, pp. 632-4). For reviews and discussions see
Dessí and Ogilvie (2004, pp.39-40), Ogilvie (2011, pp. 171-172).
64Abulaa (1987, pp. 440-1); Ashtor (1983, pp. 73-74, 271-83); Becker (1960, pp. 40, 44); Planitz (1940, p.
73); Postan (1987, pp. 292-3); Smith (1940, pp. 37, 48, 64-5, 85); Woodward (2005, pp. 631-3). See Dessí and
Ogilvie (2004, pp. 57-59), and Ogilvie (2011, p. 176) for reviews and discussions.
65Blockmans (2000, p. 414); Congdon (2003, pp. 224-5); Dilcher (1984, p. 70); Nicholas (1997, p. 133); Postan
(1987, p. 293); Smith (1940, pp. 48, 64-5); Spruyt (1994, p. 114); Woodward (2005, p. 633). For reviews see
Dessí and Ogilvie (2004, pp.38-39, 61); Ogilvie (2011, pp. 178, 180-182).
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the surplus it generates (i.e.,  < 1). In this case, guilded merchants will enjoy higher prots
than excluded merchants.
Did local merchant guilds restrict membership? Historically, the answer is yes: membership
was often contingent on having citizenshipor burgessor freestatus, from which many were
excluded.66 As towns grew, attracting large numbers of rural immigrants, this exclusion a¤ected
an increasing number of urban inhabitants. In England for instance, big towns had populations
most of whose members were not free e.g., two thirds in late-thirteenth-century in London,
a half in Oxford and more than three quarters in Exeter(Hilton, 1992, pp. 92).
A key requirement for membership of local merchant guilds was the payment of entry fees
and a variety of dues67, which is consistent with our model (members collectively needed to
fund transfers to the ruler). This implied the exclusion of those who could not a¤ord to pay
the, often substantial, entry fees, or who were unable to provide the required guarantees: To
become a gildsman...it was necessary to pay certain initiation-fees...The new comer was also
required to produce sureties, who were responsible for the fullment of his obligations to the
Gild - answering for his good conduct and for the payment of his dues(Gross, 1890, pp. 28).
The historical evidence makes it clear that many of the townsinhabitants could not meet these
requirements.68 Moreover, admission to local merchant guilds was sometimes controlled by
requiring that the potential new member be approved by a majority of existing members, and
this requirement appears to have been used to restrict membership.69
In sum, local merchant guilds excluded an increasing proportion of the urban population,
notably the least wealthy.
 Prediction 6 (Guilds social capital and town government): Guilds with lower
coordination costs ( f) are more likely to engage in other collective activities that benet
guild members
Our analysis highlights the importance of merchant guildssocial capital in reducing mem-
berscosts of coordination and organization. An important implication of this is that guilds with
substantial social capital were likely to engage in additional collective activities - beyond those
required to enforce successfully, and prot from, their exclusive rights over trade - which were
in their memberscollective interest. Perhaps the most important example of this is the role
played by merchant guilds in the emergence of town government throughout medieval Europe.
66See Dilcher (1985, pp. 88-9), Epstein (2000, pp. 35-6), Leguay (2000, pp. 110-1, 121-2), Schütt (1980, p.
131), and Spruyt (1994, pp. 144).
67For examples see Ehbrecht (1985, p. 445), on entry fees for the merchant guild of Goslar; Dilcher (1984, p.
69), and Volckart and Mangels (1999, pp. 437-8), on dues levied by the merchant guild of Tiel; Schütt (1980, pp.
112-21), on the dues levied by the merchant guild of Flensburg; Störmer (1985, pp. 366-7), on entry fees for the
merchant guild of Laufen; Origo (1986, p. 44), on entry fees for the merchant guild of Prato.
68See Hilton (1992, p. 92), and Schultze (1985, pp. 379-81).
69See Smith (1940, p. 38).
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Fryde (1985, pp. 216-7), reviewing the contributions to English historiography by Tait
(1936)70 and Martin (1963)71, notes how in some towns the gild provided the rst administra-
tion independent of the town lord, set up by the townsfolk themselves, regardless of whether the
lord was the king, a nobleman or a great abbot... a large proportion of the so-called borough
records which survive from the thirteenth century are, in fact, gild records. Moreover, guilds
often took on tasks normally undertaken by local government: in Leicester and Bristol for
instance, the gild was responsible for road, bridge and wall building and the gild chest fullled
the role of a town treasury.
In Germany, merchant guilds in towns such as Cologne played a key role in gaining autonomy
from feudal lords, and directing the administration of the town (Dollinger, 1964, pp. 27-28).
A similar pattern can be found throughout Italy (Racine, 1985, pp. 142-44). In Flanders too,
guilds played an important role in the politics and administration of towns such as Arras, Bruges,
Ghent, Lille, Saint-Omer.72
6 Extensions
The analysis developed up to this point hinges on a few simplifying assumptions. In this section
we show that its basic insights carry over when these are relaxed, and obtain some additional
implications.
Downward sloping demand and production costs. Our results clearly do not hinge on
assuming a unit demand or normalizing merchant costs to zero. To see this, consider a setting
in which merchants face a downward-sloping demand curve for their product, say D (p), and a
unit cost c > 0. We abstract from uncertainty for simplicity  i.e., normalize  = 1.
Letting
pM  argmax
p
D (p) (p  c) ;
be the monopoly price, we can dene the monopoly prot as
  D  pM  pM   c :
It is then easy to show that the tax collector solution will entail setting a unit tax such that
the equilibrium price will be the monopoly price  i.e., t = pM   c for every   and the tax
collector will extract all the merchantsprots. Similarly, all the results derived in the regime
with a guild will go through, with the di¤erence that now  represents the monopoly prots.
Allowing explicitly for merchant costs is interesting because it highlights another important
role for guilds: securing goods at the lowest possible cost to their members, thereby maximizing
70The Medieval English Borough (Manchester 1936).
71G. H. Martin, The English borough in the Thirteenth Century, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
5th ser. 13 (1963, p. 131).
72Coornaert (1948, p. 216).
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monopoly prots. In particular, it is clear from the analysis that the same coordination and
collusion ability that allows guild members to exercise monopoly power e¢ ciently relative to
consumers can help them to exercise monopsony power relative to suppliers. Indeed, the pre-
emption rights imposed by guilds on alien merchants (discussed earlier) can be interpreted as
facilitating the exercise of such monopsony power.
Imperfect commitment. Our baseline analysis assumed that the ruler can make long-term
commitments. Thus both regimes entailed a single ex-ante transfer to the ruler: the tax collector
paid for his future tax revenues from obtaining the tax farm, while the merchant guild paid for
its future prots from being given recognition and privileges (exclusive trading rights). If the
ruler cannot make long-term commitments, the single ex-ante transfer will be replaced by a fee
paid to the ruler at the beginning of every period. For the tax collector, this makes no di¤erence:
each period, before observing the realization of demand, he pays his fee to the ruler, which is the
expected value of what he will raise this period. Then he observes the realization of demand: if
it is high he sets the tax rate t =  and collects the resulting tax revenues; if it is zero there
is no trade and hence no tax revenues.
Under the guild regime, the equivalent of this is that at the beginning of each period, before
observing the realization of demand, guild members get together and collectively pay the ruler
a fee, equal to a share  of the expected value of their net joint prots in that period. If anyone
does not pay his share of this fee, the guild is abolished, and all merchants make zero prots from
then on. The key di¤erence between this setting and the one with a single ex-ante transfer to
the ruler is that merchantsexpected future returns from collusion now have to take into account
the future fees to be paid to the ruler, which makes it harder to sustain collusion: formally, the
e¤ect is akin to the e¤ect of the coordination and organization cost f .73
Thus imperfect commitment tends to make the guild regime less attractive, relative to the
tax collector regime. One implication is that kings and powerful lords should have been more
likely to grant recognition and privileges to merchant guilds than smaller, less powerful lords,
since they had greater commitment power, other things held equal.
We investigated this implication using the list of English merchant guilds in Gross (1890, pp.
9-16). Of these, we found that 66% had been granted recognition and privileges by kings, and
16% by lords. For the remainder, it was di¢ cult to establish whether the privileges were rst
granted by kings or lords, because some early documentation has been lost, and privileges were
often conrmed at later dates by subsequent charters (typically by kings). Even if we assume
that in all these cases the privileges were rst granted by lords, it is clearly the case that the
majority of merchant guilds were granted recognition and privileges by kings rather than lords.
Moreover, the 16% gure includes merchant guilds granted by powerful lords such as Robert
Fitz-Hamon, Archbishop Thurstan of York, and Richard, 1st Earl of Cornwall (second son of
73 In practice, the historical evidence shows that transfers to rulers were often made once a year, while the
appropriate unit for our trading periodwas the trading day. This suggests that rulers did have some commitment
power.
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King John).
Risk averse merchants. In our environment merchants, as well as the tax collector, are risk
neutral. What would happen if they were risk averse? In particular: how would risk-aversion
alter the trade-o¤ between the guild and the tax-collector regimes? The answer is simple: other
things being equal, risk-aversion can only make collusion more di¢ cult to sustain in the guild
regime, and hence favor the tax-collector solution. This is because risk-averse merchants will
value less than risk-neutral merchants the uncertain future stream of collusive prots, and thus
attach a lower weight to the continuation value of being in a collusive equilibrium, relative to the
spot gain from a unilateral deviation. Thus in the presence of risk-averse merchants, demand
uncertainty makes it harder to sustain collusion.
On the other hand, recent work by Abramitzky (2008) on the insurance role of a di¤erent
institution, the Israeli Kibbutz, suggests that merchant guilds might also have o¤ered some
insurance benets to risk-averse merchants, not available under the tax collector regime. The
historical evidence supports this conjecture. One example we have already discussed is the role
of merchant guilds in the government of medieval towns: this clearly helped to reduce the risk
of a local administration and regulations unfavorable to merchants. Another example, based
on evidence from guild statutes, is provided by Gross (1890, pp. 34-5): Attendance at the
funeral of deceased members, prayers for the dead, assistance to brethren in sickness, poverty
and distress... are some of the precepts inculcated by the statutes.
Further extensions. In the Appendix we show that the insights of the analysis do not change
when some of analytical restrictions made in the baseline model are weakened. Specically,
we show that results do not change qualitatively when: there are exogenous constraints on the
guild size, exclusion is non-deterministic and the state of demand is continuous rather than being
binary.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed a theory of the emergence, operation and decline of merchant guilds.
We have examined the costs and benets to medieval rulers of granting recognition and exclusive
rights to trade to merchant guilds, together with tax exemptions, in return for direct transfers.
Our theory has highlighted the role of the guildssocial capital in sustaining collusion, which is
crucial for their ability to deliver su¢ cient benets to rulers.
It is useful at this point to review alternative theories of merchant guilds, and relate them
to our model. Greif et al. (1994), as noted earlier, provide a theory of the development of alien
merchant guilds: that is, guilds of foreign (alien) merchants in a particular polity, who were
granted recognition by the ruler of that polity. Their focus, therefore, di¤ers from ours: we
propose a theory of the development of local merchant guilds  i.e., guilds of local merchants
in a particular polity, who were granted recognition (and privileges) by the ruler of that polity.
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Historically, the vast majority of merchant guilds emerged as local merchant guilds: only a
subset of these went on to establish foreign branches, or consulates, in other polities - i.e. alien
merchant guilds. Local merchant guilds dominated local trade and had a substantial impact on
the development of medieval towns: to our knowledge, we provide the rst formal model of this
important historical institution.
It is nevertheless interesting to compare the two theories. The crucial ingredient of the Greif
et al. theory is imperfect commitment by the ruler. We saw in the previous section that this
does not provide an explanation for the emergence of local merchant guilds. In their model, it
provides an explanation for the emergence of alien merchant guilds, as follows. The ruler can
expropriate alien merchants who come to trade in his polity, or fail to provide a commercially
secure environment. This reduces trade below the e¢ cient level. The ruler would therefore like
to commit not to misbehave(expropriation, commercial insecurity). He cannot do so credibly
unless alien merchants can, in turn, credibly threaten to boycott trade in the polity if the ruler
misbehaves. This requires alien merchants to belong to an organization able to enforce its
memberscompliance with any trade embargo imposed by the organization: a guild.
Interestingly, this provides a clear link with our work: in our theory, the most successful
merchant guilds are those with higher social capital (lower x and f), enabling them to coordi-
nate successfully and jointly undertake actions in their memberscollective interest. We would,
therefore, expect such local merchant guilds to establish foreign branches when a su¢ cient num-
ber of their members engaged in international trade. These foreign branches would coordinate
membersactions in foreign polities, and their relationship with the rulers of these polities (in-
cluding possible trade embargoes), in the memberscollective interest. The historical evidence
shows this is what happened: indeed, members had to belong to the local guild of their polity
of origin in order to be admitted to any of its foreign branches, and the local guild enforced
punishments against members who misbehaved. Moreover, as our model would predict, alien
merchant guilds often secured tax exemptions in return for direct transfers to rulers of the
polities where they traded. Thus our theory can easily accommodate the development of alien
merchant guilds, and shed light on their operation.
A di¤erent possible explanation for the emergence of merchant guilds concerns the rulers
time preference74: rulers sometimes needed to raise substantial revenues to fund current expen-
ditures (e.g., wars), and may have attached a greater weight to the present than merchants.
However, this does not provide a compelling case for reliance on merchant guilds rather than,
for example, tax farming75. Indeed, our analysis has examined the trade-o¤s involved in choos-
ing between these two alternatives. Historians such as Gross (1890) and Brentano (1870) have
74Ogilvie (2011, p. 162) suggests this, pointing out that rulers were likely to discount the future more than
merchant guilds.
75Dessí and Ogilvie (2004) argue that merchant guilds were attractive to rulers because they were deep-pocket
organizations, able to pool their members resources, while tax collectors were typically capital-constrained.
However, this too does not provide a compelling argument for the emergence of merchant guilds rather than,
for example, associations of tax collectors (tax farmers).
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given us invaluable insights into the evolution and operation of merchant guilds. However, their
accounts, sometimes highly critical of merchant guildscollusive practices, do not explain why
medieval rulers were happy to grant merchant guilds recognition and privileges, including the
exclusive rights to trade on which these collusive practices were based.
This paper has proposed a unied theory, able to reconcile previous explanations and the
large body of historical evidence on medieval merchant guilds. In doing so, it has also shed
some light on the role of the guilds social capital, and its importance for taxation, and the
development of towns and their government in medieval Europe.
Finally, some remarks about welfare. Obviously, a full evaluation of the welfare consequences
of medieval merchant guilds is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, we can
say something. Our analysis has shown that the impact of merchant guilds on social welfare
was complex. Clearly, any attempt to evaluate the e¢ ciency implications of the emergence of
medieval merchant guilds requires a plausible historical counterfactual. From the perspective
of medieval rulers seeking to raise revenues from the taxation of local trade, reliance on tax
collectors (tax farmers) seems a plausible counterfactual. By comparing the merchant guild
regime with the tax collector regime, we have been able to characterize the circumstances in
which the merchant guild regime represents an e¢ ciency improvement, making it possible to
minimize the costs involved in raising the desired revenue. While this clearly benets rulers
and guilded merchants, who share the gains, it generally leaves consumers indi¤erent, since the
prices they have to pay in the guild regime are the same as they would have to pay in the tax
collector regime. The exception occurs for realizations of demand that require guilded merchants
to coordinate on a price lower than the monopoly price: in this case consumers are better o¤
with the merchant guild regime.
Overall, this points to a positive assessment of the welfare impact of the emergence of mer-
chant guilds. However, we need to be cautious in our conclusions. Merchant guilds social
capital helped their members to collude e¤ectively, and secure a share of collusive prots, but
this sometimes required exclusion of individuals who would have liked to become guild mem-
bers. While these individuals were not economically worse o¤ than they would have been in
the tax collector regime, the merchant guild regime did foster inequality within the merchant
class, between increasingly wealthy guilded merchants and those who were excluded from their
protable trade. Similarly, we have seen that guilded merchants social capital helped them
play an important role in the development and administration of medieval towns, and in gaining
autonomy from feudal lords. But it also enabled them, in many cases, to impose rules that
beneted them relative to producers, fostering inequality between merchants and craftsmen.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this result follows directly from the sign of the derivative of
 (n). As explained in the text, @(n)@n  0 when x  x. Hence, by A1 the self-enforceability
constraint (2) always holds in this region of parameters regardless of n. Next, consider the case
x < x. In this region of parameters @(n)@n < 0. Hence,  (n)  0 if and only if
(n  1)

+

1   (f   x)

 
1   [  x(N   1)] ;
which yields immediately n. Applying the Implicit function Theorem to  (n)  0 it is easy to
verify that
@n
@
=

1  + 1  n
+ 1  (f   x)
;
where 1  + 1 > n, otherwise  (n) < 0 for any n. Hence,
@n
@ > 0 in the region of parameters
under consideration. Similarly, using A1, it can be shown that
@n
@
=
1
(1 )(n  1)
 + 1  (f   x)
> 0;
@n
@x
=
  x (N   1)
(x  x)2 > 0;
@n
@N
=  
x
1 
+ 1  (f   x)
< 0;
@n
@f
=   (n  1)

1 
+ 1  (f   x)
< 0;
and that
@n
@
=

1  [  x(N   1)] + (n  1) x1 
+ 1  (f   x)
> 0;
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose rst that x  x. In this region of parameters the guilds
objective function is decreasing in n and @(n)@n < 0. Hence, the optimal density is n
 = 1,
which is a viable solution under A1. Next suppose that x 2 (x; x]. In this region of parameters
the guilds objective function is increasing in n while @(n)@n  0. Hence, the optimal density is
n = n < N . Finally, consider the range x > x. In this case the guilds objective function is
increasing and @(n)@n > 0. Hence, the optimal density is n
 = N . 
Proof of Proposition 3. Although in the paper we have conned attention to the case in
which n is interior  i.e., x 2 (x; x)  for completeness here we will prove the result by
considering every possible guilds size.
Suppose rst that x  x, so that n = 1. Replacing n = 1 into the guildsobjective function
one immediately obtains
W (1) =
 (  x (N   1))
1   :
Comparing W (1) and V T we have
W (1) > V T ,    0 
x (N   1)

;
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which by A1 is in the unit interval (0; 1). Notice also that  0 is increasing in x and N , and
decreasing in .
Next suppose that x 2 (x; x), so that n = n < N . Replacing n = n into the guilds
objective function one immediately obtains
W (n) =W (1) +
(n  1) (x  f)
1   :
Comparing W (n) and V T we have
W (n)  V T =  (  x (N   1))  (n  1) (f   x)
1    
(1   )
1   =
=
1
1   [   x (N   1)  (n  1) (f   x)] :
Note that, as long as  = 0 then W (n) < V T , while W (n) > V T when  = 1. Hence:
W (n) > V T ,    1 
1


x (N   1)  (n  1) (x  f)


2 (0; 1) :
Using the denition of n the threshold  1 can be rewritten as
 1   0  
(  x (N   1)) (x  f)
 (x  x) :
Recalling that
x  f

+
(1  )

;
simple di¤erentiation of  1 implies that this threshold is increasing in N and f , while decreasing
in  and . To study the impact of  and x it is more convenient to observe that by Lemma 1
n is increasing in  and decreasing in x.
Di¤erentiating with respect to 
@ 1
@
=   1
2

x (N   1)  (n  1) (x  f)


| {z }
>0
  @n
@
(x  f)
| {z }
>0
;
implying that @ 1@ < 0.
Di¤erentiating with respect to x we have
@ 1
@x
=
N   n
| {z }
>0
  x  f

@n
@x| {z }
<0
;
implying that @ 1@x < 0.
Finally, suppose that x  x, so that n = N . Replacing n = N into the guildsobjective
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function one immediately obtains
W (N) =
  f (N   1)
1   :
Comparing W (N) and V T we have immediately
W (N)  V T ,    2 
f (N   1)

;
with  2 2 (0; 1) by A1 and  2 being increasing in N and f , and decreasing in  and .
Hence, the result stated in the proposition follows immediately by setting  1 =  
. 
Further Extensions
Constraints on the guild density. Lemma 1 and subsequent results hinge on assumption
A1 which guarantees that both a single-member guild and a guild that includes all merchants
are viable. Now we argue that our qualitative insights would not change if these assumptions
were relaxed.
Consider rst    x(N   1) < 0 and    (N   1) f  0: in this case a single monopolist
is not able to prevent unauthorized trade by its N   1 competitors, whereas operating costs are
not so high as to prevent a full-size guild. Hence, a necessary condition for a guild to be viable
is  x(N  n)  0, which implies an endogenous minimal guild density n0  N   x . Recalling
that
 (n)  
1   [  x(N   1)]  (n  1)

+

1   (f   x)

it follows that a necessary condition to prevent undercutting is now x  x. In this case  (n)  0
requires
n  n1  1 + x(N   1) 
x  x :
The ruler has thus the option of recognizing a guild if and only if
N  1 + x(N   1) 
x  x , N  1 +

x
:
When this condition is met, it can be easily veried that the optimal guild size is n = N , so
that Propositions 2 and 3 stilly apply, but only for x  x. Otherwise, the ruler prefers the tax
collector.
Next, consider   x(N   1)  0 and   (N   1) f < 0. This means that, in addition to
the constraints stated in Lemma 1, there is an additional endogenous upper-bound to the guild
density which comes from the constraint
 (  x(N   1))  (n  1) (f   x)  0; (4)
which can bind only when x  x. However, in this region of parameters n = 1. Hence, the
results of the baseline model go through even in this case.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that when
  (N   1)min

x;
f


;
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the guild solution is not viable at all. In this case the only option left to the ruler is to hire a
tax collector. Even if this result did not emerge in the baseline analysis, it is still in line with
the comparative statics of Proposition 3, showing that the emergence of a merchant guild is
positively correlated with . It also highlights once more the importance of social capital for
the guild solution.
Non-deterministic exclusion. We now consider how results are a¤ected by relaxing the
assumption that non-payment of exclusion costs by a single member is enough to give rise to
undercutting with certainty (and hence zero guild prots). In particular, we assume instead that
each members exclusion e¤ort increases the exclusion probability by 1=n, so that if all members
contribute there is exclusion, but if one member shirks exclusion succeeds with probability
(n  1) =n. As before, just for simplicity we assume that there is perfect monitoring  i.e.,
regardless of whether exclusion fails or not, if a merchant does not contribute to the exclusion
e¤ort in one period, the other members spot the deviation by the end of that period and either
exclude him from future trade or dissolve the guild, so that his prot in the punishment phase
is zero.76
An equilibrium in which active merchants quote the monopoly price and every member exerts
exclusion e¤ort can exist if and only if price deviations are not protable  i.e., if
  x (N   n)
n
+

1  

 (  x (N   n))  (n  1) f
n

 max

  x (N   n)
n
;
n  1
n


;
where the right-hand side represents the highest payo¤ a merchant can secure by undercutting
the monopoly price. In fact, while undercutting pM a deviating merchant can either decide to
exert exclusion e¤ort, in which case he obtains a prot of    x (N   n) =n, or he can refrain
from contributing to exclusion, thereby taking the risk of letting outsiders enter the market with
probability 1=n, in which case he makes zero prots.77 Note that
  x (N   n)
n
 n  1
n
 ,   x (N   n) ;
which must be true in order for the guild to be protable  i.e.,
 (  x (N   n))  (n  1) f  0 )   x (N   n) :
Hence, when the guild is protable, the best strategy for a deviating merchant is to undercut
the monopoly prot and exert the exclusion e¤ort  i.e.,
max

  x (N   n)
n
;
n  1
n


=   x (N   n)
n
:
This implies that the baseline analysis is still valid in an environment with a di¤erent monitoring
technology, in which limited free-riding on the exclusion e¤ort is less harmful than we assumed
in the baseline model.
Imperfect collusion. Our baseline analysis for the guild regime entails perfect collusion when
demand is positive  i.e., guilded merchants charge the monopoly price pM =  if and only
if v = . It is interesting, as an extension of the basic analysis, to consider circumstances
76This assumption is made only to simplify the exposition, it can be shown that nothing changes when there is
perfect monitoring regarding price deviations but shirking on the exclusion e¤ort is not observed if exclusion is
successful. The proof is available upon request.
77When exclusion fails the market equilibrium is the competitive one.
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in which imperfect collusion may occur in equilibrium. In particular, if demand can take more
than two values, it can be the case that for very high demand states the equilibrium will entail
imperfect collusion  i.e., guilded merchants will charge a price below the monopoly price (albeit
still above the competitive price, hence still a collusive price). The intuition for this is that for
very high demand states, the spot gain from deviation may be too high to sustain the perfectly
collusive outcome.
Formally, we can study this possibility by assuming that the consumers willingness to pay,
v , is determined by the realization of a continuous random variable drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [0; 1], which is identically and independently distributed over time
(see, e.g., Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). For simplicity we abstract from explicit consideration
of exclusion and coordination costs (i.e., we set x = f = 0), and just assume that one-member
guilds are not feasible78, so that the guild regime requires collusion.
Let n (where N > n > 1) be the subset of active merchants belonging to the guild. A
collusive outcome is sustainable as long as it is in each merchants best interest not to break the
agreement. This requires
v
n
+
E [v]
(1  )n  v; (5)
in any given state v. The left-hand side of this condition can be interpreted as the (discounted)
gain from cooperation, while the right-hand side is the spot gain from deviation.
Rearranging equation (2), collusion can be sustained in state v if and only if
v  E [v]
(n  1) (1  ) : (6)
Thus for su¢ ciently large realizations of v it may not be possible to sustain full collusion 
i.e., the potential gain from deviation becomes too large. In this case, the collusive agreement
will require merchants to set the highest possible price level compatible with the no cheating
condition (6) so as to mitigate the temptation to undercut. More precisely, there exists a
threshold v  1 such that: for all v  v full collusion is viable and each merchant obtains
earns v=n, while for v > v full collusion is not sustainable and the maximal prot that a guild
member can obtain is v=n.79 The threshold v is endogenously dened by (6) holding as an
equality  i.e.,
v =
E [v]
(n  1) (1  ) ; (7)
where
E [v] =
Z v
0
vdv + (1  v)v: (8)
Hence, when demand is su¢ ciently high, the guild will obtain an aggregate prot (v) which
is lower than the monopoly level. Substituting (8) into (7) we have
v =

(n  1) (1  )
"Z v
0
vdv + (1  v)v
#
=
2(1  n(1  ))

:
Notice that the larger is the guild density  i.e., the larger is n  the lower is v, since each
78Historically, we have found no records of one-member merchant guilds. The smallest guild size we are aware
of is n = 23, for the sh merchantsguild in Worms (see, e.g., Seider, 2005, p. 49).
79The case where v < 1 corresponds to instances where in order to support collusion in states higher than v
merchants must charge a price lower than the monopoly one. Formally, this implies that the guild total prot in
each of these states is v with  = v=v  1.
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merchant is tempted to deviate more often when the gain from collusion has to be shared among
many. Hence, a collusive outcome can obtain as long as the guild density does not exceed the
endogenous upper-bound n above which v = 0  i.e.,
v > 0 , n < n  1
1   ;
with n now being the solution with respect to n of v = 0. As a result, when N is large enough
some merchants will be excluded from trade.
This extension of the model is interesting for two reasons: rst, because it shows that
restrictions on guild membership can arise as a consequence of the need to sustain collusive
outcomes when faced with high realizations of demand. Second, because it highlights a possible
advantage of the guild regime from the point of view of consumers, relative to the tax collector
regime: consumers would clearly be better o¤ under the guild regime in high demand states
(v > v), since they would pay a price below the monopoly price.
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